https://labs.parabola.nu/https://labs.parabola.nu/favicon.ico?15367742552019-04-13T18:01:46ZParabola Issue TrackerPackages - Feature Request #2282: Add cryptsetup emergency self destructionhttps://labs.parabola.nu/issues/2282?journal_id=119642019-04-13T18:01:46ZAnonymous
<ul></ul><p>Current repository: <a class="external" href="https://git.kali.org/gitweb/?p=packages/cryptsetup.git;a=summary">https://git.kali.org/gitweb/?p=packages/cryptsetup.git;a=summary</a></p> Packages - Feature Request #2282: Add cryptsetup emergency self destructionhttps://labs.parabola.nu/issues/2282?journal_id=119652019-04-13T18:28:52ZAnonymous
<ul></ul><p>Tried to build using upstream and kali/master branches, there is no luksAddNuke.</p> Packages - Feature Request #2282: Add cryptsetup emergency self destructionhttps://labs.parabola.nu/issues/2282?journal_id=119662019-04-13T18:41:19Zbill-auger
<ul></ul><p>this seems like a feature request better proposed to the upstream - have you asked them?</p>
<p><a class="external" href="https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/">https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/</a></p> Packages - Feature Request #2282: Add cryptsetup emergency self destructionhttps://labs.parabola.nu/issues/2282?journal_id=119672019-04-13T18:50:45Zfreemor
<ul></ul><p>Interesting idea.. but legally likely to get you into more trouble then out of it.</p>
In most jurisdictions;
<ul>
<li>destruction of evidence is illegal</li>
<li>lying to the cops/etc is illegal</li>
</ul>
<p>In some jurisdictions you can be legally compelled to provide passwords (as in the right one) giving them the wrong one and then not being able to provide a correct one could land you in serious trouble.</p>
<p>I'm not saying any of these are reasons for us not to provide it. But people need to be aware that this is probably gonna get you in more trouble.</p>
<p>Also a lot of authorities are smart enough these days to shoulder surf and grab your device once you unlock it and only then announce their presence.</p> Packages - Feature Request #2282: Add cryptsetup emergency self destructionhttps://labs.parabola.nu/issues/2282?journal_id=119812019-04-14T12:45:53ZAnonymous
<ul></ul><p>IIRC, this feature was rejected by upstream.<br />Sometimes, illegal rubber‐hose cryptoanalysis may be used.</p> Packages - Feature Request #2282: Add cryptsetup emergency self destructionhttps://labs.parabola.nu/issues/2282?journal_id=119822019-04-14T12:49:05ZAnonymous
<ul></ul><p>Update: it was. <a class="external" href="https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/raw/master/FAQ">https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/raw/master/FAQ</a> (5.21)</p> Packages - Feature Request #2282: Add cryptsetup emergency self destructionhttps://labs.parabola.nu/issues/2282?journal_id=119832019-04-14T12:51:56ZAnonymous
<ul></ul><p>Also, the user could lie about password being forgotten and try to guess, providing nuke password.</p> Packages - Feature Request #2282: Add cryptsetup emergency self destructionhttps://labs.parabola.nu/issues/2282?journal_id=119902019-04-15T00:22:45Zfreemor
<ul></ul><p>REad through the Upstreams reasoning and pasting it below to save people the scrolling and to preserve it for this issue if the link goes dead at some future date. Their reasoning is strong, and in line with some of what I said above. I feel that this is probably best left as something a motivated user can compile and install them selves (against all the below reasoning). If they really want it.</p>
<p>From the Upstream link above:<br /><pre>
* 5.21 Why is there no "Nuke-Option"?
A "Nuke-Option" or "Kill-switch" is a password that when entered upon
unlocking instead wipes the header and all passwords. So when
somebody forces you to enter your password, you can destroy the data
instead.
While this sounds attractive at first glance, it does not make sense
once a real security analysis is done. One problem is that you have
to have some kind of HSM (Hardware Security Module) in order to
implement it securely. In the movies, a HSM starts to smoke and melt
once the Nuke-Option has been activated. In reality, it just wipes
some battery-backed RAM cells. A proper HSM costs something like
20'000...100'000 EUR/USD and there a Nuke-Option may make some sense.
BTW, a chipcard or a TPM is not a HSM, although some vendors are
promoting that myth.
Now, a proper HSMs will have a wipe option but not a Nuke-Option,
i.e. you can explicitly wipe the HSM, but by a different process
than unlocking it takes. Why is that? Simple: If somebody can force
you to reveal passwords, then they can also do bad things to you if
you do not or if you enter a nuke password instead. Think locking
you up for a few years for "destroying evidence" or for far longer
and without trial for being a "terrorist suspect". No HSM maker will
want to expose its customers to that risk.
Now think of the typical LUKS application scenario, i.e. disk
encryption. Usually the ones forcing you to hand over your password
will have access to the disk as well, and, if they have any real
suspicion, they will mirror your disk before entering anything
supplied by you. This neatly negates any Nuke-Option. If they have
no suspicion (just harassing people that cross some border for
example), the Nuke-Option would work, but see above about likely
negative consequences and remember that a Nuke-Option may not work
reliably on SSD and hybrid drives anyways.
Hence my advice is to never take data that you do not want to reveal
into any such situation in the first place. There is no need to
transfer data on physical carriers today. The Internet makes it
quite possible to transfer data between arbitrary places and modern
encryption makes it secure. If you do it right, nobody will even be
able to identify source or destination. (How to do that is out of
scope of this document. It does require advanced skills in this age
of pervasive surveillance.)
Hence, LUKS has not kill option because it would do much more harm
than good.
Still, if you have a good use-case (i.e. non-abstract real-world
situation) where a Nuke-Option would actually be beneficial, please
let me know.
</pre></p>